It is a courageous enterprise that challenges the predominance of the cognitive approach in pragmatics by underpinning a different way to understand the notion of meaning.
Recently, Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance proposed to generalize Brandom's normative pragmatics in order to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the normativity that governs discursive practices. While Wittgenstein believes that there is no privileged language game, Brandom maintains that the game of giving and asking for reasons is fundamental for the possibility of any linguistic practice to be properly meaningful. One of the most striking clashes between the results of Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on language games and Robert Brandom's normative analysis of pragmatics concerns the pride of place granted by the latter to assertional practices. I look at the relationship between section 403 and texts from the 1929 notebooks and the Philosophical Remarks, assembled in the spring of 1930, mapping out the earlier development of this line of argument and exploring the principal continuities and discontinuities in Wittgenstein's treatment of private language. W.'s pain," I should do other people no injustice, so long as a notation were provided in which the loss of the word 'pain' in other connections were somehow supplied." However, the discussion of this topic in the Investigations is much briefer than in the pre-1936 writing. One strand in this discussion that is directly taken up in the Investigations is the idea that "If I were to reserve the word 'pain' solely for what I had hitherto called 'my pain', and others "L. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein did repeatedly discuss the idea of a language which "only I myself can understand" during 1929-36. The post-1936 writing on private language represents a fresh start, both in wording and in conception, on the pre-1936 material.
The discussion of private language in the Investigations was written between 19, after the first 190 remarks of part I of the book had almost reached their final form.
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